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HEALTHISM, INTERSECTIONALITY, AND 
HEALTH INSURANCE: THE COMPOUNDED 
PROBLEMS OF HEALTHIST DISCRIMINATION 
 
Jacqueline R. Fox* 
 
Healthism can identify situations where a person is subject 
to a particular form of bigotry based on their individual health 
status.  In health insurance, some forms of healthism are 
unavoidable due to the very nature of health insurance 
structures.  However, when analyzing health insurance 
programs, particularly those that are funded through 
government, it is possible to utilize a healthism framework to, 
first, recognize and minimize the worst effects of outright bigotry 
and, second, minimize and potentially ameliorate the worst 
effects of healthism combined with intersectionality.  This Essay 
analyzes these issue as they relate to health insurance, 
Medicare, and the potential role of the Independent Payment 
Advisory Board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Jacqueline R. Fox, J.D., LL.M, is an associate professor of health law and 
bioethics at the University of South Carolina School of Law.  Fox received her J.D. 
and LL.M at Georgetown University Law Center and was post-doctoral Greenwall 
Fellow in health policy and bioethics and a Yale University Donaghue Visiting 
Scholar of Research Ethics.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 This Essay takes an initial look at health insurance, and 
then examines Medicare’s Independent Payment Advisory Board 
by utilizing the framework developed by Jessica L. Roberts and 
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard in their forthcoming book, Healthism: 
Health Status Discrimination & the Law.1  The book defines a 
form of prejudice called “healthism” and lists factors used to 
determine whether healthism is present in a particular 
situation.  These factors consider whether a behavior or activity 
is: (1) driven by animus; (2) unfairly stigmatizing; (3) 
punishment for private conduct; (4) an impediment to accessing 
health care; (5) a complete barrier to accessing health care; (6) 
producing worse healthcare outcomes; and (7) maintaining or 
increasing current disparities.2  Currently, health insurance in 
the United States presents significant problems with a majority 
of these factors.  The Medicare program, enacted to directly 
address the elderly population’s struggle to access health 
insurance, demonstrates more subtle healthism challenges than 
the private insurance marketplace, but both models highlight 
ongoing issues in the very design of a third-party payer system.   
 During the 2016 election, President Trump and the 
Congressional majority promised significant changes to the 
current healthcare system, raising the potential for a large 
disruption to this system in the near future.3  Given this 
possibility, the country should consider the healthism factors 
when discussing the social justice implications of the current 
system and possible reform efforts.   
 The ramifications of healthism are significant, but the 
problem is compounded when healthism is combined with 
 
 1.  JESSICA ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS LEONARD, HEALTHISM: HEALTH 
STATUS DISCRIMINATION & THE LAW (Cambridge U. Press, forthcoming 2017). 
 2.  Jessica Roberts & Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, What Is (and Isn’t) Healthism?, 
50 GA. L. REV. 833, 895 (2016). 
 3.  Alison Kodjak, Trump Can Kill Obamacare With Or Without Help From 
Congress, NPR (Nov. 9, 2016, 7:05 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2016/11/09/501203831/trump-can-kill-obamacare-with-or-without-help-from-
congress [https://perma.cc/4XWG-UW6P]. 
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intersectionality.  First, health insurance healthism can 
exacerbate disparate treatment due to race, gender, disability 
status, gender identity, and body norms, which adds a layer of 
injustice and burden.  Second, when healthism is combined with 
animus, bigotry, or unconscious bias, it can influence insurance 
plan design, coverage decisions, or the promulgation of 
governmental regulations in the health care realm, which 
further exacerbates and entrenches these problems.   
II. HEALTH INSURANCE  
 By definition, a private marketplace for health insurance 
has qualities that prejudice people based on their individual 
health status.  Health insurance, in its purest form, is a product 
that healthy people buy in case they become sick or are injured, 
much like a homeowner purchasing fire insurance.  As with fire 
insurance, each member pays money into a pool of funds that is 
used to cover any costs the members have if an insured event 
occurs.  Similarly, the insurance company calculates, in advance, 
the amount of money that must be in the pool by determining 
the likelihood of any particular illness or injury occurring in the 
covered population, and how much it will cost to provide care for 
that illness or injury.  Individuals purchasing insurance, by 
contributing to this pool, agree to cross-subsidize each other if 
these events occur.  This works because it is impossible to 
identify who will suffer an illness or injury, but those individuals 
recognize that a proportion of a given population is likely to 
suffer from an illness or injury.  
 Consistent with this concept of insurance, health insurers 
developed methods to identify and exclude people who did not 
have a perfect health status because the model, as described 
above, does not anticipate paying for known and fixed upfront 
costs.  For example, if an insurer knows an applicant’s illness 
will cost $20,000 to treat, a realistic price for participation in an 
insurance plan would be $20,000 plus the risk of generating any 
additional costs.  Any other outcome results in existing plan 
members subsidizing health care needs that were generated 
FOXFINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/17  7:16 PM 
2017] HEALTHISM 283 
prior to entering into an agreement to cross-subsidize newly 
emerging and unpredictable health care needs.  Before a health 
insurance plan is sold, the marketers must determine the likely 
cost of providing care so the pool has sufficient funds to cover 
care, and the beneficiaries of the pool are charged the correct 
amount.  To do this, the marketers examine attributes of the 
population likely to be covered and predict how much it will cost 
to provide that population with the care that is promised in the 
insurance contract.  Within these calculations, a plan can use a 
community rating, which assesses the health care costs for a 
swath of a population, for example, adults in Cincinnati who 
seek private insurance.  A plan could also choose to only offer 
insurance to individuals whose personal risk of developing an 
illness is low.  This is accomplished through underwriting, a 
process where an applicant is required to fill out a questionnaire 
from the insurance company asking for specific information 
related to their health status.  The company then declines to sell 
that applicant insurance if the risks of future costs presented by 
their individual health status appear too great.  The individual 
underwriting process allows the plan to set a lower price for each 
individual who is covered because the members allowed into the 
pool are healthier to begin with.  A plan may also offer insurance 
to someone, but specifically exclude payments for any health 
care costs related to an existing condition.  Most plans use a 
combination of these methods to calculate cost and determine 
whether to cover a new member and whether to include specific 
exclusions by blending qualities of a community with specific 
details about the health status of an individual.   
 In such insurance plans, even if a plan selects new members 
using strict criteria, new members generally have an 
introductory time frame where they are covered by a plan but 
are not covered for pre-existing conditions.  For example, new 
members may not have medical care paid for if it is related to a 
symptom that predates the plan’s start date.  
 The effect of this system is to identify and exclude people 
solely based on pre-existing health problems, which is a perfect 
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example of healthism.  The effect of this exclusion of people 
based on pre-existing conditions, in turn, is to impede, and 
perhaps entirely foreclose access to, health care (due to 
prohibitive cost), which produces measurably worse health 
outcomes.  
 There are numerous federal and state laws and regulations 
that seek to alter this marketplace; and due in large part to 
these changes, current health insurance bears little resemblance 
to a pure form of insurance.  For example, the Consolidated 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) was 
enacted in 19864 and requires, in pertinent part, that employers 
who provide health insurance to their employees must give 
employees who leave their jobs the option to continue being 
insured under the company’s plan for a specified period of time. 
This does not fix the problems with gaining access to individual 
insurance, but delays when the problems occur.  This law 
reduces some effects of healthism by allowing a person with a 
health issue to have continuous access to health care during the 
covered time.  However, the requirement that the patient pay 
the cost of the insurance is difficult for people who are sick and 
unable to work. 
 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
19965 (HIPAA) requires, in pertinent part, private insurance 
companies to allow new members to use time during which they 
had health insurance from an immediately prior group 
insurance plan to avoid a delay in accessing coverage for care in 
the new plan, eliminating any bar to coverage for pre-existing 
conditions.  This greatly reduces problems related to accessing 
care, but only benefits employees who participated in an 
employer-sponsored insurance plan and leaves individuals who 
do not have access to employer-sponsored insurance unprotected 
 
 4.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, title 
I, § 601, as added Pub. L. 99–272, title X, § 10002(a), Apr. 7, 1986, 100 Stat. 227; 
amended Pub. L. 101–239, title VII, §§ 7862(c)(1)(B), 7891(a)(1), Dec. 19, 1989, 103 
Stat. 2432, 2445.   
 5.  Pub. L. 104–191, August 21, 1996, 110 Stat 1936. 
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and at risk.  Intersectionality is particularly useful in 
pinpointing flaws in this law.  A study conducted in 1997, a year 
after HIPAA was first passed, found that while 64% of the 
overall workforce had employer-sponsored health insurance, 
there were measurable disparities across different races.6  For 
white non-Hispanics, 69% had employer coverage.7  For blacks 
and Hispanics, respectively, the numbers were 52% and 44%,8 
meaning that the protection offered by HIPAA gave a 
disproportionate positive effect to whites overall.  
 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act9 (ACA), 
enacted in 2010, has a number of provisions controlling the 
marketplace.  For example, people may only purchase insurance 
that is subject to the enrollment protections of the ACA during 
an open enrollment season or due to a delineated life event, such 
as giving birth.10  This creates a limited window in which to 
purchase insurance if an individual becomes sick, thus 
protecting the functionality of the marketplace as described 
above.  Within the open enrollment time frame, insurance 
companies may not refuse to issue policies due to the health 
status of the potential member,11 but they may charge a specific 
range of higher rates because of a member’s age,12 location of 
residency,13 or tobacco use,14 all of which can be used as rough 
 
 6.  Allyson G. Hall, Karen Scott Collins & Sherry Glied, Employer-Sponsored 
Health Insurance: Implications for Minority Workers, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 1, 
2, 5 (1999), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/Hall_employer-sponsored.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D3KS-68DQ] [hereinafter 2015 Highlights]. 
 7.  Id. at 5. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012). 
10.  Health Insurance Reform Requirements for the Group and Individual 
Health Insurance Markets. 45 C.F.R. pt. 147 (2014). 
11.  45 C.F.R. § 147.104, 147.106, 147.108 (2014). 
12.  45 C.F.R. § 147.102(a)(1)(iii) (2014).  Insurance companies may charge older 
adults higher premiums than younger adults, limited to three times what they 
charge younger adults. 
13.  45 C.F.R. § 147.102(b) (2014).  Insurance companies are allowed to charge 
more to those who live in areas where medical costs are high because of the 
geographic location. 
14.  45 C.F.R. § 147.102(a)(1)(iv) (2014).  Insurance companies may charge 
tobacco users up to 1.5 times what they charge those who do not use tobacco 
products. 
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estimates of the potential cost to insure.  Again, these reforms, 
while helpful, continue to demonstrate healthism.    
 First, by limiting enrollment to a specific season, uninsured 
individuals who become sick or injured outside of the season 
cannot purchase insurance.  Since health care is simply too 
expensive for most people to self-fund, the enrollment period 
prevents some individuals from accessing health care when they 
most need it.  Second, allowing insurers to charge higher 
premiums due to age is a placeholder for the higher health care 
costs associated with increased age,15 thus allowing a less direct 
but still healthist cost burden.  Finally, allowing an increased 
charge for those who use tobacco products both stigmatizes and 
punishes people who choose to privately consume these legal 
products.  Accordingly, this charge could make it less likely they 
will purchase insurance due to the increased cost, which then 
leads to impeded access and worse outcomes for a population 
that is known to be at a higher risk for poor health.16   
 As it is currently defined, health insurance bears little 
resemblance to classic insurance, not only due to regulations, 
such as those discussed above, but also due to the massive 
changes in health care and populations since the middle of the 
20th century, when the earlier model of health insurance was 
prevalent.  Today, more money is spent on health care, more can 
be done to help people, and the types of problems people are 
living with have changed dramatically.17  Currently, health care 
in the United States is extremely expensive, costing roughly 
 
15.  Id. 
16.  Alex C. Liber et al., Tobacco Surcharges on 2015 Health Insurance Plans 
Sold in Federally Facilitated Marketplaces: Variations by Age and Geography and 
Implications for Health Equity, 105 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH S696, S696-98 (2015). 
(“[T]obacco users tend to have lower income and employment, and the current 
dynamic will ensure that these individuals will be further financially burdened by 
the tobacco surcharge, even to the point that insurance through the health insurance 
exchange remains unaffordable even after subsidization.  Little systematic evidence 
has been collected on the effect of tobacco surcharges on consumer behavior or health 
outcomes.”). 
17.  See Joseph L. Dieleman et al., US Spending on Personal Health Care and 
Public Health, 1996-2013, 316 JAMA 2627 (2016). 
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$10,000 per person per year.18  Given the numerous 
recommendations for preventive care,19 some of these expenses 
are for care that non-symptomatic people receive to identify and 
treat previously unknown problems at an early stage before a 
discovered condition becomes more severe, which means that 
even if one were to limit insurance purchasing to healthy people, 
it will still carry the fixed costs of preventive care.  Furthermore, 
a large percentage of Americans have chronic conditions that can 
be treated and controlled, but not healed.20  Allocating the cost of 
managing and treating these conditions is a pervasive feature of 
any current payment system. 
 In light of preventive care, the high number of people with 
chronic conditions, and the overwhelming proportion of people 
who utilize the healthcare system, a model of insurance where a 
member is healthy at enrollment and presents a limited risk of 
incurring any covered costs is no longer useful for a system that 
is meant to cover most Americans.  It is likely, and probably 
preferable, that all members will have health care expenses over 
time and many of them will have expensive chronic care needs. 
People become increasingly complex insurance risks over time 
and, over the course of a lifetime, will most likely find it difficult, 
if not impossible, to access health care within a traditional 
insurance marketplace.  
The inherent conflict between the historic financial basis for 
insurance and the current health care needs of the insured 
 
18.  This data is as of 2015, see National Health Expenditures 2015 Highlights, 
CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV. (2015), https://www.cms.gov/research-
statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata 
/downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7C2-LEQ2]. 
19.  For a list of recommendations made by the United States Preventive 
Services Task Force, see Published Recommendations, U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERV. 
TASK FORCE (2017), https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/BrowseRec/ 
Index/browse-recommendations [https://perma.cc/6DBT-M3UQ].  There are currently 
ninety-eight separate recommendations.  Id. 
20.  According to data collected by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 
roughly half of American adults have a chronic condition.  Chronic Diseases: The 
Leading Causes of Death and Disability in the United States, CTR. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/overview/ 
[https://perma.cc/P3T6-7S73]. 
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population leads to a system where healthism is present, but 
increasingly opaque.  Third-party payers still have incentives to 
use people’s health status as a reason to treat them differently, 
but have limited means to do so transparently.  It is a poor 
model for a system if one seeks to provide care without 
healthism influencing access and treatment.   
To understand the risk of a more opaque form of healthism, 
one must realize that the financial stakes are high and 
information is asymmetrical.  Third-party payers, including 
private and governmental insurers, pay a significant share of 
health care expenses, roughly 89% overall.21  In this high-stakes 
atmosphere, insurance consumers are at a disadvantage.  The 
process of pricing health insurance is exceedingly complex, and 
such complexities of the health needs of the population continue 
to make it increasingly so.  Within that complexity, however, it 
is relatively simple for actuarial science to predict the costs a 
specific person is likely to incur for health care in a given year.  
Even in this current system, with some limitations on insurance 
company behavior and an understanding that most people 
present some risk of cost, a sophisticated approach assessing a 
potential member’s health status and dissuading that person 
from either joining a plan or utilizing care, can have important 
financial implications.  The consumer, not realizing their health 
status can be assessed and this assessment can change how an 
insurer relates to them, is thus vulnerable. 
III. THE INDEPENDENT PAYMENT ADVISORY BOARD 
 The ACA creates the Independent Payment Advisory 
Board22 (IPAB), which acts as a mechanism for controlling costs 
of the Medicare program.  Medicare currently provides insurance 
to people over the age of 65 and those with disabilities.23  IPAB 
 
21.  2015 Highlights, supra note 18, at 2. 
22.  See Independent Payment Advisory Board, 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk (2012). 
23.  Title XVIII of the Social Security Act is administered by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services.  Health Insurance for the Aged Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1395-1395ccc (2012).  Regulations of the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
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has two primary responsibilities related to Medicare.  First, if 
Medicare costs per capita are projected to increase a significant 
amount in the future, IPAB puts together a package of 
recommendations that will reduce these costs to an acceptable 
level.24  The content of the package is subject to significant 
limitations, such as proposals within it cannot reduce “access”25 
and cannot cut any care that is already covered by the Medicare 
program.26  Many commentators originally envisioned IPAB to 
focus entirely on reducing the payments that Medicare makes to 
physicians for specific types of care.27  However, access 
considerations make it unlikely that any significant reductions 
can occur in this manner because it would reduce the number of 
physicians who provide services.28  Additionally, because IPAB 
cannot cut types of care that are currently covered, it must, by 
necessity, focus its efforts on identifying and limiting coverage 
for new medical care, drugs, and devices that are not currently 
covered.29 
 If IPAB proposes a package and Congress does not respond, 
it becomes law.30  If Congress opens the package up for debate 
and alters any aspect of it so that the cost reduction is lessened, 
Congress must then explicitly fund the increase through the 
 
relating to Title XVIII are contained in 42 C.F.R. pt. 430-485 (2014). 
24.  See Independent Payment Advisory Board, 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk (2012) (“. . . 
while maintaining or enhancing beneficiary access to quality care under this 
subchapter.”). 
25.  Id. 
26.  Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(II) (2012) (“The proposal shall not include 
any recommendation to ration health care, raise revenues or Medicare beneficiary 
premiums under section 1395i–2, 1395i–2a, or 1395r of this title, increase Medicare 
beneficiary cost-sharing (including deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments), or 
otherwise restrict benefits or modify eligibility criteria.”). 
27.  For a full discussion of this statute, see Jacqueline Fox, Death Panels: A 
Defense of the Independent Payment Advisory Board, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 132 
(2014). 
28.  Id. 
29.  It may be possible for IPAB to consider new uses of previously covered care, 
drugs, or devices.  This would be a fair reading of the statute, but is not specifically 
expressed. 
30.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395kkk(e)(1), (3) (2012). 
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budget.31  Once the package is opened, Congress can alter it, as 
well as Medicare more generally, in any manner.   
 IPAB has not yet been created, as the Medicare program 
has not projected increased costs sufficient to trigger it.  Once it 
is created, it must, in addition to creating a package, issue 
annual reports that recommend methods for reducing costs 
across the entire health care system in the United States, which 
is its second major responsibility.32  These reports are not bound 
by the same limitations the package is subject to and, thus, can 
presumably cover anything.  Of particular interest here, given 
the package focus is likely to be on future developments in 
health care and there is a lengthy process by which new 
developments are studied and receive federal marketing 
approval, the annual report could include early stage 
recommendations to those developing new technologies as to how 
IPAB wishes them to constrain future costs.   
 Accordingly, there are three distinct areas within the IPAB 
scheme that have risks regarding healthism.  These areas 
include the package, Congressional action on the package, and 
the annual reports. 
 Despite there being three primary risks of healthism within 
IPAB’s structure, concrete measures can be taken to reduce 
these risks.  First, any decision regarding coverage that is based 
on statistical data will most likely create winners and losers 
based on health status, given that the data is imperfect.  Second, 
if any type of care is excluded, it will have a disproportionately 
worse effect on those who already suffer from the social 
determinants of health, as they will have fewer personal 
resources to ensure access in a private market.  Third, outright 
animus or unconscious bias can fuel a package of 
recommendations or a subsequent Congressional debate, as 
some people may be perceived as being less worthy of protection 
 
31.  See id. § 1395kkk(d)(3) (2012). 
32.  Id. 
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or provision of health care, particularly when scarce resources 
are being allocated. 
 Program-based cost controls, which are proposals for what 
exactly will be covered or excluded across the program, rely on 
data regarding the effectiveness of a particular intervention.  
This type of decision could have healthist implications.  For 
example, a payer is considering two antibiotics, A and B, for a 
particular bacterial infection that exhibits specific symptoms, 
but is not usually diagnosed with a test to identify the specific 
bacteria strain.  Antibiotic A works in 80% of the people and 
antibiotic B works in 20%.  If antibiotic A is covered and 
antibiotic B is not, or if antibiotic A is the first line of treatment 
and antibiotic B is the second, some statistical group will likely 
be harmed by this choice because some people may only respond 
to antibiotic B and not antibiotic A.  At least arguably, those 
with a bacterial infection who only respond to antibiotic B will 
suffer harm from this decision due to their health status.   
 As another example, consider a procedure that costs $100 to 
provide and is effective in 50% of patients who receive it.  For 
every 1,000 patients (providing the numbers hold across that 
population), 500 of them will be cured, costing $200 per cure. 
The procedure will directly waste $50,000 for every 1,000 
patients, and 500 of them will be exposed to potential risks from 
the procedure while receiving no benefit.   
 Both of these examples demonstrate that it is imperative, 
from a healthism perspective, to consistently generate reliable 
data about effectiveness and make increasingly accurate 
assessments about the best care for individuals.  Population-
based assessments make sense when allocating scarce resources, 
and this argument is not meant to challenge that approach.  
Rather, an acknowledgment of the healthist effects of such a 
decision require that it be implemented with an eye towards 
continual refinement to alleviate future harms that spring from 
health status.  Furthermore, given that one can statistically 
pinpoint an area of waste, as in the second example, and waste 
in one area causes resources to be unavailable for the treatment 
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of other patients, a healthism framework advocates for a system 
that continually searches for a better and more accurate patient 
population for any procedure.   
 When a particular form of care is beneficial and still 
excluded from coverage, the burden of providing that care is 
shifted to the patient.  By applying an intersectionality analysis, 
this burden, based initially on health status, may become 
significantly more burdensome to those who are members of an 
otherwise marginalized group.   
 Medicare and other third-party payers continually struggle 
with the level of illness that a patient must suffer to justify 
covering an admission to a hospital or continuing to keep a 
patient in the hospital.  In theory, many sick people can be cared 
for at home.  Doing otherwise wastes scarce resources, such as 
money and hospital beds, and perhaps, unnecessarily disrupts 
patients’ lives.  However, for those who have insufficient 
resources for home care, a decision to not admit or discharge 
them heightens the risk of many factors of healthism.  People 
who do not have a home simply cannot receive home-based care.  
Medical instructions requiring a caretaker are burdensome for 
those who do not have a person to help them throughout the 
time frame when they need assistance.  It may be difficult or 
impossible to purchase the medical aids, special foods, or 
medicines that are required for those of limited means.  
Additionally, those with limited literacy or cognitive disabilities 
may have difficulty understanding and following complex 
directions.  Accordingly, admission criteria may lead to reduced 
access to care and worse health outcomes, while compounding 
existing disparities.33  Concrete evidence of this problem can be 
seen in readmission statistics, which consistently show that 
 
33.  In a study that sought to understand why patients living in poverty had 
worse outcomes after discharge than patients who had greater financial means, one 
patient explained, “I knew I couldn’t do the things they were asking me to do.  So, I 
just sort of gave up.  I knew I would end up back in the hospital.”  Susannah M. 
Bernhein & Joseph S. Ross, Hospital Discharge and the Transition Home for Poor 
Patients: “I Knew I Couldn’t Do What They Were Asking Me”, 29 J. GEN. INTERN. 
MED. 269, 270 (2013). 
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patients of lower economic status consistently have higher 
readmission rates than those who have more resources.34 
 A focus on healthism and intersectionality reveals that a 
more holistic approach to broad coverage decisions is necessary 
to provide more just and effective treatment, as well as 
minimizing waste.  Third-party payer decisions that seem 
facially neutral, such as what severity of illness justifies 
hospitalization, must consider the disparate effect of these 
decisions on those who are more vulnerable.  A policy is certainly 
flawed when it worsens the effect of these background 
conditions, and perhaps is flawed unless it ameliorates them. 
For example, for those who do not have sufficient resources, the 
Medicare plan could be changed to provide coverage for a 
residential stay in an institution that can provide the proper 
level of care.   
 A final example is animus and bias for those with specific 
health conditions and those who have both a health condition 
and a particular trait that can be the focus of bias or outright 
bigotry.  When making scarce resource allocations with regards 
to providing health care, some people will lose based on their 
health status, as the very decisions themselves concern which 
health problems are addressed and by what means.  These 
decisions will be a challenge both when IPAB creates a package 
and when Congress chooses to alter the package’s contents.  
However, these decisions can be made in a way that is honest 
and respectful, acknowledging trade-offs and minimizing the 
effect of animus and bias.   
 Congressional debates regarding the opening of a package is 
a particular area of concern.  A debate over the allocation of 
scarce resources could inspire political catering to those with 
higher standing in the political system and distort the outcome 
in favor of those people, while worsening existing inequalities 
that led to others having lesser political power in the first place. 
It should be possible to minimize injustice in such a procedure.  
 
34.  Id. at 269. 
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Accordingly, defining healthism and being aware of the 
pernicious effect of healthism combined with intersectionality 
concerns is a significant first step.  It seems, though, that more 
could be done.  Given that these concerns are reasonable, it 
seems equally justifiable to require auditing of proposals prior to 
debate so that some effort is made to identify the negative effects 
of any proposal and the populations who stand to suffer from 
them, as well as the beneficial effects and those who will receive 
them.   
IV. CONCLUSION  
 Some degree of healthism is possibly unavoidable in 
insurance markets and government-sponsored insurance 
programs.  However, an awareness of healthism in its most 
pernicious form, particularly when combined with other forms of 
bigotry, can serve to help these programs become more just and 
ethically defensible.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
